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1159 
Note 
 
Treating Adults Like Children: Re-Sentencing 
Adult Juvenile Lifers After Miller v. Alabama 
Brianna H. Boone* 
At only fourteen, Kuntrell Jackson was sentenced to life 
without parole.1 In 1999 Kuntrell and his friends agreed to rob 
a video store, and on the way to the robbery Kuntrell’s friend 
revealed that he was carrying a gun.2 During the robbery 
Kuntrell’s friend shot and killed the storeowner.3 Kuntrell was 
found liable on a felony-murder theory, which required a man-
datory minimum sentence of life without parole.4 Eventually, in 
a 2012 opinion for Miller v. Alabama the Supreme Court held 
that sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life without pa-
role is unconstitutional unless the sentencing court takes the 
unique circumstances of youthfulness into account.5 The Su-
preme Court stressed that juveniles have transitory personali-
ties and should have an opportunity for reform.6 Now, as a re-
sult of Miller, Kuntrell Jackson could receive a lesser sentence 
and one day be granted parole and released from prison.7 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court granted Kuntrell Jackson the benefit 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School. I would 
like to thank Professor Perry Moriearty for her assistance and support in this 
Note. I would also like to thank Professors Jessica Clarke and Barbara Welke 
for their encouragement and support. I thank Emily Bodtke for her willing-
ness to listen and collaborate, as well as for her friendship. Finally, I would 
like to thank Aaron Zaidman, Breena Boone, and my parents for their con-
stant love and support. Copyright © 2015 by Brianna Boone. 
 1. Inmate Details of Kuntrell Jackson, ARK. DEP’T OF CORR., http://adc 
.arkansas.gov/inmate_info/search.php?dcnum=128638&a=1&firstname=ku 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (providing information about Jackson’s age and sen-
tence). 
 2. Jackson v. Arkansas, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004). 
 3. Id. at 759. 
 4. Id.; Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907–08 (Ark. 2013). 
 5. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 6. See id. at 2469. 
 7. See id. at 2475 (remanding both Miller’s and Jackson’s cases). 
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of retroactive application of Miller, reopening his case and or-
dering a new sentencing trial.8 Several other states such as 
Mississippi and Massachusetts have granted Jackson’s fellow 
juvenile lifers the benefit of Miller, placing a mass of re-
sentencing trials on sentencing courts’ dockets.9 
Kuntrell is no longer fourteen though; he is a twenty-nine10 
year old man who spent his critical character-developing years 
in prison, without any hope of freedom.11 Kuntrell no longer 
carries the unique circumstances of youthfulness, because he is 
no longer a child.12 His character has developed, and some fac-
tors the Supreme Court requires courts to consider when sen-
tencing juveniles to life without parole are no longer relevant.13 
Many other juvenile lifers throughout the country facing re-
sentencing hearings are in this unusual situation along with 
Kuntrell Jackson.14 
Miller fails to address this common15 paradox of taking 
youthfulness into account when re-sentencing a juvenile lifer 
who is no longer a juvenile.16 The Supreme Court simply states 
that youthfulness must be taken into account during sentenc-
ing because juveniles have three unique characteristics: unde-
veloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to environmental 
 
 8. Norris, 426 S.W.3d at 909–10. 
 9. See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 275–
76 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–03 (Miss. 2013) (en banc). 
 10.  Note that all references to the age of offenders are ages at the time of 
this writing. 
 11. Inmate Details of Kuntrell Jackson, supra note 1. 
 12. See Jeffery Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Develop-
ment from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 
469 (2000) (arguing that the key development years for people run through the 
mid-twenties). 
 13. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 2466, 2469 (outlining the three most 
important differences between adults and juveniles: lack of maturity, vulnera-
bility, and transitory personality). For the argument that the “transitory per-
sonality” factor is no longer relevant to adult juvenile lifers, see infra Part 
II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.1 (pointing out examples of adult juvenile lifers 
throughout the country). 
 15. See Ashby Jones, Life Sentences’ Blurred Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 
2013, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ 
print/WSJ_-A003-20130904.pdf (stating that there were approximately 2,100 
juvenile lifers sentenced pre-Miller). 
 16. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (remanding Miller’s and Jacksons’ cases for 
further proceedings without explaining how evidence of their youthfulness 
should matter in a re-sentencing hearing). 
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influences, and lack of a defined character.17 It is unclear how 
to take the third characteristic, often referred to as “transitory 
personality,”18 into account during a re-sentencing hearing. 
There is no longer a present interest in giving the juvenile of-
fender a chance to reform his or her personality. This is a prob-
lem because Miller relies on this characteristic more heavily 
than the others.19 In the cases following Miller no lower courts 
have identified this problem.20 In Kuntrell Jackson’s case the 
Arkansas Supreme Court simply granted him a re-sentencing 
hearing where he can present “Miller evidence,” without de-
scribing how this evidence should be used in determining Jack-
son’s sentence.21  
This Note argues that it is paradoxical to re-sentence juve-
nile lifers who are now adults by taking youthfulness charac-
teristics into account. It is moot for a court to determine that a 
lower sentence than life without parole is warranted because of 
the juvenile offender’s transitory personality when the offender 
no longer has a transitory personality.22 This Note offers a solu-
tion for retroactively applying Miller to juvenile offenders who 
are now adults without requiring complete re-sentencing hear-
ings that look at crimes in a vacuum. Part I overviews the Su-
preme Court’s juvenile justice cases, the retroactivity doctrine, 
and courts’ treatment of Miller’s retroactivity thus far. Part II 
determines that Miller is retroactive, and discusses the prob-
lems inherent in re-sentencing juvenile lifers and/or offering 
them parole. Part III proposes a “hybrid hearing” solution, 
 
 17. Id. at 2464, 2475 (“[Our] cases relied on three significant gaps be-
tween juveniles and adults. First, children have a ‘lack of maturity and an un-
derdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk-taking. Second, children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative in-
fluences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers . . . . 
And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are 
‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravi-
ty.’” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005))). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 2465, 2469 (using the terms “transient rashness” and 
“transient immaturity” to describe an essential characteristic of juveniles). 
 19. See infra Parts I.B. and II.B. 
 20. A handful of lower courts have ordered re-sentencing hearings. See 
infra Part I.C. 
 21. Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907, 910 (Ark. 2013) (“We also in-
struct that a sentencing hearing be held in the Mississippi County Circuit 
Court where Jackson may present for consideration evidence that would in-
clude that of his ‘age-related characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime.” 
(quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475)). 
 22. See Arnett, supra note 12, at 469 (“For most people, the late teens 
through the midtwenties are the most volitional years of life.”). 
BOONE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:10 PM 
1162 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1159 
 
which would allow courts to conduct hearings that are a mix-
ture between sentencing and parole hearings. In “hybrid hear-
ings,” courts would look at some of the “youthfulness” charac-
teristics from Miller as related to the crime, but also the 
offender’s current characteristics. This allows courts to address 
the transitory personality characteristic ex-post, while avoiding 
the problem a simple re-sentencing hearing presents when ad-
dressing this characteristic. 
I.  THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR RETROACTIVELY 
APPLYING MILLER V. ALABAMA   
The problem presented by Miller occurs at the intersection 
of two areas of law: a presumption of lessened culpability for 
juvenile offenders and the retroactivity doctrine.23 Understand-
ing the evolution of both areas of law is necessary to properly 
analyze retroactive application of Miller. Part A overviews the 
Supreme Court’s juvenile justice cases. Part B of this section 
provides background of the retroactivity doctrine. Part C ex-
plains how state and federal courts have interacted with Mil-
ler’s retroactivity thus far. 
A. “YOUTHFULNESS” AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Over the last decade the Supreme Court has issued a 
steady stream of opinions requiring lessened culpability for ju-
veniles in criminal convictions.24 Although not formally known 
as the “youthfulness” doctrine, the Court repeatedly references 
important characteristics of youthfulness throughout these de-
cisions that are central to the Miller holding.25 Understanding 
this trend of Supreme Court reasoning is necessary to fully un-
derstand what Miller requires in re-sentencing trials. 
In a 1979 case, Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court held 
that there are three reasons children’s constitutional rights do 
not equal adults’ rights: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of chil-
dren, (2) children’s inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed and mature manner, and (3) the importance of the pa-
 
 23. See generally Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Miller and Its Aftermath, 
SENT’G L. & POL’Y, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/ 
assessing-miller-and-its-aftermath (last updated Nov. 9, 2014) (following post-
Miller problems relating to juvenile justice and retroactivity). 
 24. See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionali-
ty, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Dis-
count, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 263–64 (2013). 
 25. See id. at 312–14. 
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rental role in child rearing.26 This holding formally separated 
adults’ and children’s constitutional rights, and although it did 
not concern juvenile criminal conviction, the Court used this 
reasoning in later juvenile criminal cases.27 
A few years after Bellotti, the Court held in Eddings v. Ok-
lahoma that youthfulness is a relevant mitigating factor that a 
sentencer cannot be precluded from considering during sen-
tencing.28 The Court reasoned that youthfulness is relevant 
when mitigating sentences because “[i]t is a time and condition 
of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and 
to psychological damage.”29 This is the first time the Court ref-
erenced the idea of lessened culpability in criminal convictions 
because of youthfulness.30 
Over the last decade there have been four critical Supreme 
Court opinions where the Court held particular sentences for 
juvenile offenders constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
and violate the Eighth Amendment.31 In Thompson v. Oklaho-
ma a plurality held that sentencing juveniles under the age of 
sixteen to death is cruel and unusual punishment.32 The Court 
reasoned that a juvenile’s “[i]nexperience, less education, and 
less intelligence” makes him or her less able to evaluate the 
consequences of his or her actions’, and therefore death is too 
severe a punishment, especially since it will not have a deter-
rence effect.33 The Court later extended this holding to all juve-
niles up to eighteen years old in a majority opinion for Roper v. 
Simmons.34 Roper laid out three characteristics demonstrating 
that “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders”: (1) they lack maturity and are 
more likely to have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,35 
(2) they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influ-
 
 26. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–35, 637 (1979). 
 27. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982). 
 28. Id. at 115. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id.; Feld, supra note 24, at 272. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 32. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). 
 33. Id. at 835, 837. 
 34. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). In a case that fell be-
tween Thompson and Roper, the Court upheld the death penalty for sixteen- 
or seventeen-year-old juveniles convicted of murder, acknowledging that juve-
niles have diminished culpability but rejecting a categorical ban of the sen-
tence. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), overruled by Roper, 543 
U.S. at 575. 
 35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
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ences and outsides pressures,36 and (3) their characters are not 
as well-formed as an adult’s.37 The first two characteristics are 
pulled from Bellotti and Eddings, and the last characteristic is 
new to Roper.38 
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court went beyond the 
death penalty, holding that subjecting non-homicide juvenile 
offenders to life without parole violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.39 Graham emphasized that a life without parole sentence 
for a juvenile offender assumes “that the juvenile offender for-
ever will be a danger to society,” and that this assumption is 
not founded in psychology and brain science.40 The Court 
stressed that incorrigibility is inconsistent with the character-
istics of juveniles, and that “juveniles are more capable of 
change than are adults . . . their actions are less likely to be ev-
idence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions 
of adults.”41 The Court reasoned that since juveniles’ personali-
ties are not fixed, a life without parole sentence for non-
homicide offenders is disproportionate because it denies juve-
niles “a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”42 
Most recently, in Miller the Court held that requiring 
mandatory sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violates 
the Eighth Amendment.43 The Court reiterated the three fac-
tors from Roper, and found that mandatory life without parole 
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders precludes considera-
tion of these three factors.44 Similar to Graham, the Court 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 570 (“The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, 
less fixed.”); see also Feld, supra note 24, at 277. 
 38. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–
16 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–35, 637 (1979). 
 39. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010). Graham is a complete 
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide of-
fenders, so courts cannot sentence non-homicide juveniles to life without pa-
role even after taking youthfulness into account. Feld, supra note 24, at 299. 
 40. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (“As petitioner’s amici point out, develop-
ments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differ-
ences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain in-
volved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.”). 
 41. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
 42. Id. at 72–73. The Court also points out that even though the state 
claims Graham is incorrigible because of later prison misbehavior, a life with-
out parole sentence was still disproportionate because the judgment of Gra-
ham’s incorrigibility was made at the outset, before he had chance to reform. 
Id. 
 43. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 44. Id. at 2468. 
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stressed that mandatory life without parole for juveniles is dis-
proportionate because it treats juveniles the same as adults, 
without considering their differences.45 The punishment is also 
disproportionate because it “disregards the possibility of reha-
bilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.”46 
Since the Miller holding was only a categorical ban on 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders, and not a complete ban of the sentence (like in Roper 
or Graham),47 courts can still sentence juvenile homicide of-
fenders to life without parole after taking an offender’s “youth 
and attendant circumstances” into account.48 A judge or jury 
must have the opportunity to consider a juvenile offender’s 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences before issuing a life without parole sentence.49 
The Court points out that the instances when a court will still 
find a juvenile deserves life without parole after taking youth-
fulness into account will be rare.50 The Court reasons that since 
there is “great difficulty . . . distinguishing between . . .‘the ju-
venile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption,’” courts will unlikely find that juvenile 
homicide offenders deserve life without parole.51 
B. THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court’s “retroactivity doctrine,” although a 
relatively recent development,52 has a volatile history.53 
Throughout its existence the doctrine has undergone substan-
 
 45. Id. at 2466. 
 46. Id. at 2468. 
 47. Feld, supra note 24, at 272–73, 299. 
 48. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 49. Id. at 2468–69. 
 50. Id. at 2469 (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this 
decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harsh-
est possible penalty will be uncommon.”). 
 51. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
 52. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (holding for the 
first time that there is no constitutional mandate to apply new rules of crimi-
nal procedure retroactively). 
 53. See generally Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus—Retroactivity of Post-
Conviction Rulings: Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 975, 977–88 (1994) (providing a summary of all the changes the ret-
roactivity doctrine has undergone). 
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tial changes several times,54 and some parts are still contest-
ed.55 Since the retroactivity doctrine is unstable, it is necessary 
to track the evolution of the doctrine to understand its current 
form, and how it applies to Miller. 
Throughout most of the twentieth century the Court retro-
actively applied new constitutional rules to all cases on direct 
review (cases on direct appeal) and collateral review (cases in-
volving post-conviction challenges after direct appeals are ex-
hausted).56 Eventually, in 1965 the Supreme Court issued an 
opinion in Linkletter v. Walker stating that there is no constitu-
tional mandate to apply new constitutional rules retroactively, 
and that the decision to apply a new rule retroactively is de-
termined by weighing several factors.57 This holding created the 
retroactivity doctrine.58 
The Court did not distinguish between cases on direct and 
collateral review, and subsequent cases used the Linkletter fac-
tors for both case types.59 Eventually, in a 1989 plurality opin-
ion for Teague v. Lane the Supreme Court diverged from this 
approach,60 adopting a new doctrine that requires new constitu-
tional rules apply retroactively to cases on direct review, but 
not to cases on collateral review.61 The Court found two excep-
tions to the non-retroactivity generally afforded collateral re-
view cases.62 The first exception allows retroactive application 
of new substantive rules that “place[] ‘certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358–59 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (disagreeing about whether the retroactivity doctrine only applies 
to determinations of convictions and not determinations of sentences). 
 56. Finley, supra note 53, at 977–78. 
 57. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629 (“[W]e must then weigh the merits and 
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its 
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard 
its operation.”). 
 58. Finley, supra note 53, at 978. 
 59. See id.  
 60. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague plurality’s retroac-
tivity doctrine was accepted by majorities throughout subsequent opinions, so 
the doctrine is binding precedent. See Finley, supra note 53, at 982 (“In a se-
ries of Supreme Court cases, the major aspects of the plurality’s opinion in 
Teague gained support from majorities of the Court.”). 
 61. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. 
 62. Id. at 311–15. 
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law-making authority to proscribe.’”63 The second exception al-
lows retroactive application of “watershed” procedural rules 
that implicate the fundamental fairness and the accuracy of the 
conviction.64 If neither exception is met, new constitutional 
rules are not retroactively applied to cases on collateral re-
view.65 
Although the retroactivity doctrine laid out in Teague rep-
resents the Court’s current retroactivity approach, the Court 
has clarified and shifted certain aspects of the doctrine over 
time. For example, the Court has clarified that substantive 
rules not only include new rules that alter the range of conduct 
the law punishes, but also classes of individuals the law pun-
ishes, such as juveniles.66 The Court has also defined and nar-
rowed the parameters of “watershed” procedural rules.67 The 
Court has made it clear that the essential element of a water-
shed procedural rule is not that it implicates the fundamental 
fairness of a conviction, but that it “so ‘seriously diminishe[s]’ 
accuracy that there is an ‘impermissibly large risk’ of punishing 
conduct the law does not reach.”68 For example, in Schriro v. 
Summerlin, the Court held that a new constitutional rule’s re-
quirement that a jury, not a judge, must find an aggravating 
circumstance necessary to impose the death penalty was not a 
watershed procedural rule and should not be applied retroac-
tively.69 The Court stressed that even though evidence shows 
 
 63. Id. at 311 (holding that the “fair cross section requirement to the petit 
jury” is not a substantive rule because it would not accord constitutional pro-
tection to any primary activity). 
 64. Id. at 311–12, 315 (“Because the absence of a fair cross section on the 
jury venire does not undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a 
conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate convic-
tion, we conclude that a rule requiring that petit juries be composed of a fair 
cross section of the community would not be a ‘bedrock procedural element’ 
that would be retroactively applied under the second exception we have articu-
lated.”). 
 65. Id. at 311.  
 66. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 350, 353 (2004) (“A rule is 
substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class 
of persons that the law punishes.”). 
 67. Although this Note only highlights the confusion surrounding the def-
inition of “watershed procedural rule,” the Court also struggled with simply 
defining “new rule” in the cases following Teague. See Finley, supra note 53, at 
981–88. The current accepted iteration defines “new rule” as a rule not dictat-
ed by precedent at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Whorton 
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).  
 68. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 355–56 (alteration in original) (quoting Teague, 
489 U.S. at 312–313). 
 69. Id. at 357–58. 
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juries are more accurate fact-finders, a trial in which a judge 
finds aggravating factors could not be so impermissibly inaccu-
rate to require retroactive application of the new rule, and ul-
timately a new trial.70 As a result of the Court’s narrowing the 
procedural rule exception, only one rule has ever satisfied the 
exception: Gideon v. Wainwright’s71 requirement that indigent 
defendants charged with felonies must be appointed counsel.72 
To clarify, in its current state the retroactivity doctrine 
precludes retroactive application of new rules to cases on col-
lateral review unless the rule satisfies one of two exceptions.73 
If the new rule is substantive, for example it alters the class of 
individuals the law punishes, then the rule is retroactive.74 If 
the new rule is procedural it is only retroactive if the rule af-
fects the accuracy of conviction and implicates the fundamental 
fairness of a conviction, with more focus on accuracy than fair-
ness.75 Since the procedural rule exception is extremely narrow, 
usually only new substantive rules retroactively apply to cases 
on collateral review.76 
C. MILLER AND THE COURTS 
When the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, twen-
ty-eight states had sentencing schemes subjecting some juve-
nile homicide offenders to mandatory life without parole sen-
tences.77 There are now at least 2,100 juvenile homicide 
offenders serving sentences of life without parole,78 and many 
 
 70. Id. at 356–57. 
 71. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 72. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (pointing to Gideon as the only procedural 
rule meeting the exception). No procedural rules have passed the test since the 
modern inception of the doctrine. See Tadhg Dooley, Whorton v. Bockting and 
the Watershed Exception of Teague v. Lane, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=djclpp_sidebar (“Since the Teague 
standard was announced, the Court has not found a single rule that satisfies 
its requirements.”); see, e.g., Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418, 420 (holding that new 
rule requiring cross-examination to admit prior testimonial statements of wit-
ness that have since become unavailable is not a watershed procedural rule). 
 73. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52. 
 74. Id. at 353. 
 75. See id. at 355–56. 
 76. See Dooley, supra note 72. 
 77. See Jones, supra note 15 (providing map that shows states with man-
datory life without parole sentences). 
 78. Id.; see also Map: Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole in the U.S., 
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/etc/map 
.html (last updated May 21, 2009). 
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state and federal courts must grapple with the retroactivity 
doctrine and determine how Miller applies to these juveniles.79 
1. State Courts 
Eleven state supreme courts have issued opinions concern-
ing Miller’s retroactivity.80 The courts’ treatment of Miller’s ret-
roactivity varies widely, and there is no clear trend regarding 
whether and how state courts will retroactively apply Miller.81 
In Jackson v. Norris, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied 
Miller retroactively to a case on collateral review without decid-
ing the retroactivity issue, remanding the defendant’s case to 
the lower court for a new sentencing trial comporting with Mil-
ler.82 The court did not give detailed instructions for how the 
lower court should conduct the re-sentencing hearing. The Ar-
kansas court simply ordered a sentencing hearing in which the 
defendant “may present . . . evidence that would include that of 
his ‘age-related characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime.’”83 
The highest courts in Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Illinois, and Texas applied Miller retroactively to 
cases on collateral review after conducting full retroactivity 
analyses.84 All six courts held that Miller created a new sub-
stantive rule, and is retroactive under the first Teague excep-
tion.85 Iowa and Nebraska reasoned that, even though Miller 
looks like a procedural rule on the surface and has procedural 
components, it is a substantive change in the law because it 
categorically bans mandatory life without parole sentences.86 
Nebraska elaborated that Miller requires sentencers to consid-
er new facts before sentencing juveniles to life without parole, 
 
 79. See infra Part II.B. 
 80. See infra notes 82–106 and accompanying text. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907 (Ark. 2013). 
 83. Id. (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012)). 
 84. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 
N.W.2d 107, 115–17 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 
N.E.3d 270, 278–82 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–02 (Miss. 
2013) (en banc); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 729–31 (Neb. 2014); Ex 
parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
 85. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115; Diatchenko, 1 
N.E.3d at 278–82; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702; Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731; Ex 
parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75. 
 86. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115; Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 729–30 (“[T]he 
Miller rule includes a substantive component. Miller did not simply change 
what entity considered the same facts. And Miller did not simply announce a 
rule that was designed to enhance accuracy in sentencing.”). 
BOONE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:10 PM 
1170 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1159 
 
and is therefore substantive.87 Massachusetts and Mississippi 
similarly reasoned that, because states cannot subject juveniles 
to life without parole for all murder convictions, Miller created 
a substantive change in the law.88 Nebraska was also persuad-
ed by the fact that the Nebraska legislature had to change its 
first-degree murder sentencing range for juveniles after Mil-
ler.89 The Iowa, Massachusetts, Illinois and Nebraska courts 
additionally pointed out that since the Supreme Court remand-
ed Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on collateral review, for 
re-consideration after Miller, the Supreme Court wants Miller 
to be retroactive.90  
Some of these courts slightly explained what they expect 
out of new sentencing hearings.91 In Jones v. State, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court required the lower court to consider all 
circumstances from Miller before sentencing the defendant to 
life without parole.92 In State v. Mantich, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court ordered re-sentencing according to a revised Ne-
braska sentencing statute, allowing the offender to submit evi-
dence relating to the youthfulness characteristics from Miller.93 
 
 87. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 730 (“Effectively, then, Miller required a 
sentencer of a juvenile to consider new facts, i.e., mitigation evidence, before 
imposing a life imprisonment sentence with no possibility of parole. In our 
view, this approaches what the Court itself held in Schriro would amount to a 
new substantive rule: The Court made a certain fact (consideration of mitigat-
ing evidence) essential to imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment with-
out parole.”). 
 88. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278–82 (“The rule explicitly forecloses the im-
position of a certain category of punishment – mandatory life in prison without 
the possibility of parole – on a specific class of defendants: those individuals 
under the age of eighteen when they commit the crime of murder.”); Jones, 122 
So. 3d at 702 (“Following Miller, Mississippi’s current sentencing and parole 
statutes could not be followed in homicide cases involving juvenile defendants. 
Our sentencing scheme may be applied to juveniles only after applicable Mil-
ler characteristics and circumstances have been considered by the sentencing 
authority. As such, Miller modified our substantive law by narrowing its ap-
plication for juveniles.”). 
 89. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731.  
 90. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 116; Diatchenko, 1 
N.E.3d at 281–82. 
 91. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112–13, 122; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 703; 
Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 732. In Diatchenko, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court also determined that discretionary sentences of life without parole are 
unconstitutional under state law, so the defendant’s sentence was automati-
cally mitigated to life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years. 1 N.E.3d 
at 286. 
 92. Jones, 122 So. 3d at 701 n.4.  
 93. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 732; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2) 
(2013) (explicitly pointing to age at the time of the offense, impetuosity, family 
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In Ex parte Maxwell, the highest court in Texas dictated that 
the defendant cannot be sentenced to life without parole until 
the sentencing court considers his “individual conduct, circum-
stances, and character.”94 In State v. Ragland, the Iowa Su-
preme Court affirmed a re-sentencing hearing already conduct-
ed by a district court.95 In the hearing, the defendant presented 
evidence that he had a strong support network and a likely 
chance for successful rehabilitation, and the district court miti-
gated his sentence to life with the possibility of parole after 
twenty-five years.96  
Minnesota, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania held 
that Miller is not retroactive.97 All four courts agreed that Mil-
ler handed down a “new rule,”98 but held that the rule is proce-
dural and not substantive.99 The courts reasoned that since Mil-
ler did not categorically ban life without parole sentences for 
juveniles, it is a procedural rule.100 As further evidence that the 
rule is procedural rather than substantive, Louisiana and Min-
nesota pointed out that Miller did not create a new element for 
juvenile homicide conviction.101 
 
and community environment, ability to appreciate risks and consequences of 
the conduct, intellectual capacity, and mental health evaluation as mitigating 
factors the court can consider). 
 94. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
 95. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122. 
 96. Id. at 112–13. The defendant had already served for twenty-five years, 
so he was eligible for parole immediately. Id. at 113.  
 97. See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La. 2013); People v. Carp, 852 
N.W.2d 801, 827–28 (Mich. 2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 
(Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013). The 
Louisiana Supreme Court determined Miller is not retroactive despite previ-
ously applying Miller retroactively to two cases that came before it on collat-
eral review. See State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28, 28 (La. 2012) (per curiam); 
State v. Graham, 99 So. 3d 28, 29 (La. 2012). 
 98. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 831; Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 820; Chambers, 831 
N.W.2d at 326; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10. 
 99. Tate, 130 So. 3d at 831; Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 825; Chambers, 831 
N.W.2d at 328; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10. 
 100. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 837 (“[Miller] simply altered the range of per-
missible methods for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole . . . .”); Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 825; Chambers, 831 
N.W.2d at 328; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (“Since, by its own terms, the Mil-
ler holding ‘does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders,’ it is 
procedural and not substantive for purposes of Teague.”). 
 101. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 837 (“[Miller] did not alter the elements neces-
sary for a homicide conviction.”); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 329. 
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All four courts also held that Miller is not a watershed pro-
cedural rule.102 The courts reasoned that requiring presentation 
of youthfulness characteristics before handing out severe sen-
tences to juveniles is a well-established principle, and Miller is 
simply an outgrowth of previous juvenile justice cases.103 The 
courts also determined that Miller does not rise to the level of 
Gideon,104 the case that announced the procedural rule change 
the Supreme Court has dubbed “watershed.”105 Pennsylvania 
additionally pointed out that a majority of Supreme Court jus-
tices would not agree that Miller is a watershed procedural 
rule.106 
2. Federal Courts 
Four federal circuit courts have addressed Miller’s retroac-
tivity in some capacity.107 Similar to the state courts, there is no 
consensus among the federal courts about this issue.108 
The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits all allowed defend-
ants to file successive motions based on Miller because the de-
fendants made prima facie showings that Miller is retroac-
tive.109 Although none of the courts fully analyzed Miller’s 
retroactivity, and left it to district courts to determine, they 
seem to agree that Miller should be retroactive.110 
 
 102. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 839–41; Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 826; Chambers, 
831 N.W.2d at 330–31; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10. 
 103. See, e.g., Tate, 130 So. 3d at 835–36; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 331. 
 104. See, e.g., Tate, 130 So. 3d at 841 (“[W]e find [Miller] cannot be con-
strued to qualify as being ‘in the same category with Gideon’ in having ‘effect-
ed a profound and “sweeping” change.’”); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 331; Cun-
ningham, A.3d at 10. 
 105. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007).  
 106. See Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (“We doubt, however, that a majority 
of the Justices would broaden the [procedural rule] exception beyond the ex-
ceedingly narrow (or, essentially, class-of-one) parameters reflected in the line 
of decisions referenced by the Commonwealth.”). 
 107. See In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); 
In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Johnson v. 
United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720–21 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); In re Mor-
gan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 
WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). 
 108. Compare In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. at 371 (stating that the defend-
ant has made a prima facie case of retroactivity), and In re Pendleton, 732 
F.3d at 282 (same), and Johnson, 720 F.3d at 721 (same), with In re Morgan, 
713 F.3d at 1368 (denying retroactivity of Miller), and Craig, 2013 WL 69128, 
at *2 (same). 
 109. See In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. at 371–72; In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 
at 282; Johnson, 720 F.3d at 721. 
 110. See In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. at 371; In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d at 
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Both the Fifth111 and Eleventh Circuits held that Miller is 
not retroactive.112 The Eleventh Circuit denied a defendant 
permission to file a successive motion based on Miller because 
it reasoned that Miller is not a new substantive rule.113 The 
Fifth Circuit, giving the most in-depth analysis of Miller’s ret-
roactivity of all the federal courts, held, in an unpublished opin-
ion, that Miller is not substantive because it is not a categorical 
bar on life without parole.114 The Fifth Circuit also held that 
Miller is not a watershed procedural rule because it is an out-
growth of prior opinions pertaining to individual sentencing for 
juveniles.115 
3. United States Supreme Court 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed 
Miller’s retroactivity, it has made decisions some courts and 
commentators believe signal the Court’s favorable position on 
Miller’s retroactivity. In issuing Miller the court also remanded 
Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on collateral review.116 
Some courts and commentators have used this as evidence that 
Miller is retroactive.117 Also, shortly after the Miller decision, in 
Mauricio v. California (Mauricio received a discretionary life 
without parole sentence and argued that the trial court failed 
to properly balance all relevant factors during sentencing)118 the 
Court issued an order granting certiorari, vacating the lower 
decision, and remanding the case to a lower court (GVR)119 for 
 
282; Johnson, 720 F.3d at 721. 
 111. The Fifth Circuit has issued split opinions on this issue. 
 112. See In re Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1368; Craig, 2013 WL 69128, at *2. 
 113. In re Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1368. 
 114. Craig, 2013 WL at 69128, *1–2. 
 115. Id. at *2. 
 116. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (reversing both Jack-
son’s and Miller’s cases). 
 117. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013); Marsha 
L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson: 
Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 
380 (2013) (“The Court’s application of its holding in Miller to Jackson’s case 
necessarily dictates retroactivity of the new rule.”). But see People v. Carp, 828 
N.W.2d 685, 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (arguing that the new hearing granted 
to Jackson does not matter because retroactivity was not an issue before the 
Court), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014). 
 118. Lyle Denniston, A Puzzle on Juvenile Sentencing, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 
16, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/a-puzzle-on-juvenile 
-sentencing. 
 119. A GVR order is an order issued by the Supreme Court that grants a 
petition for certiorari, vacates the decision of the court bellow, and remands 
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“further consideration in light of Miller v. Alabama.”120 One 
commentator argues that even though Mauricio is not a man-
datory life without parole case the GVR suggests the Court is 
“inviting lower courts to tinker with the notion that Miller has 
a substantive bite.”121 
Despite certain Supreme Court moves pointing to a possi-
ble pro-retroactivity ruling in the future, Miller’s retroactivity 
remains undetermined.122 There is widespread disagreement 
among courts concerning Miller’s retroactivity, many holding 
that Miller creates a new substantive rule and is therefore ret-
roactive,123 and many others holding that Miller creates a pro-
cedural rule that fails the retroactivity test.124 Additionally, 
those courts applying Miller retroactively have not definitively 
determined how to implement Miller’s youthfulness character-
istics during new sentencing hearings.125 Juvenile lifers’ post-
Miller statuses are inconsistent and will likely be settled by the 
Supreme Court at a future date.126 
 
the case for further proceedings—usually in light of an intervening new law or 
fact. Sena Ku, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power: Drawing a Line Between Def-
erence and Control, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2008). 
 120. Mauricio v. California, 133 S. Ct. 524, 524 (2012). 
 121. Alexander Satanovsky, Habeas Corpus - Alex’s First Post, HABEAS 
CORPUS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_ 
corpus_blog/2012/10/habeas-corpus-alexs-first-post.html (“The GVR strongly 
suggests that Miller may in fact be more than a procedural rule . . . but rather 
a substantive restriction . . . .”). 
 122. The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for any Miller retroac-
tivity cases at the time of this writing.  
 123. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. 
Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 279, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 
122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013) (en banc); People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 
1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 124. See In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, 
No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013); State v. Tate, 
130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 
(Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013); Geter 
v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); People v. Carp, 828 
N.W.2d 685, 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014). 
 125. See Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 910–11 (Ark. 2013); Ragland, 
836 N.W.2d at 115; Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702; 
Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022. 
 126. See Douglas A. Berman & Robert J. Watkins, Third Circuit Concludes 
Juves Serving LWOP Made “Prima Facie Showing that Miller Is Retroactive,” 
SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Oct. 4, 2013), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_ 
law_and_policy/2013/week40/index.html (“Because of the circuit split noted by 
the Third Circuit . . . the Supreme Court is surely likely to take up this issue 
in some form at some point in the not too distant future.”). 
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II.  GIVING JUVENILE LIFERS THE BENEFIT OF MILLER 
V. ALABAMA   
Granting juvenile lifers post-Miller justice requires a find-
ing that Miller is retroactive, and developing a practical meth-
od to re-sentence these offenders. Section A of this Part cri-
tiques some state courts’ conclusions that Miller is not 
retroactive, and determines that Miller should be considered 
retroactive. Section B explains that retroactively applying Mil-
ler creates a paradox of treating adults like children, because 
transitory personality is a foundational principle in Miller that 
is irrelevant to adult juvenile lifers. Section B also analyzes 
courts’ and legislatures’ current efforts to apply Miller retroac-
tively, and concludes that none of these efforts solve the para-
dox. Section C addresses potential problems juvenile lifers will 
face in parole hearings, whether they arrive at the hearing via 
re-sentencing or an automatic lesser sentence. 
A. RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
Before examining how to retroactively apply Miller to ju-
venile lifers, it is necessary to determine if Miller is retroactive 
for cases on collateral review. Based on Teague, if Miller cre-
ates a substantive rule, then it is retroactive.127 Additionally, if 
Miller creates a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates 
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of juvenile lifers’ convic-
tions (with more emphasis on accuracy),128 then it is retroac-
tive.129 If Miller does not fall into either category, then it is not 
retroactive for cases on collateral review.130 
1. Miller Creates a New Substantive Rule 
 If Miller is retroactive it will likely be because it creates 
a new substantive rule, because the Supreme Court has not 
held any new procedural rules pass the test.131 It is likely that 
the Supreme Court would find Miller creates a new substantive 
rule, despite the fact that it does not place a categorical ban on 
life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. 
First, Miller “alters the . . . class of persons that the law pun-
 
 127. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1988). 
 128. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355–56 (2004). 
 129. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12, 315.  
 130. See id. at 311.  
 131. See Dooley, supra note 72. 
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ishes,” which is one way a new rule qualifies as substantive.132 
Miller precludes the law from imposing mandatory life without 
parole sentences on juvenile offenders.133 The law can still im-
pose mandatory life without parole on adult offenders,134 there-
fore Miller simply limits the class of persons subject to manda-
tory life without parole.135  
Second, even though several courts have ruled that Miller 
does not create a new substantive rule,136 it is because they 
failed to separate a mandatory life without parole sentence 
from a sentencing range where life without parole is the maxi-
mum after considering youthfulness characteristics. Even 
though one could argue (and courts have) that the only differ-
ence between these two sentencing ranges is that one requires 
a different procedure (considering youthfulness characteristics) 
before imposing life without parole on a juvenile,137 the differ-
ence is not procedural. The second range forces the sentencing 
judge to consider other possible sentences as well—life without 
parole is not the juvenile’s only option. This is a substantive 
difference. Miller creates a substantive rule that requires more 
sentencing options than life without parole for juvenile homi-
cide offenders.  
2. Miller Could Be a Watershed Procedural Rule 
If the Supreme Court ever rules on Miller’s retroactivity, 
and decides Miller does not create a substantive rule, it is pos-
sible the Court would find Miller is the first modern example of 
a “watershed” procedural” rule. In Schriro v. Summerlin, the 
Court ruled that having a jury, not a judge, find the presence of 
an aggravating circumstance necessary for the death penalty is 
not a watershed procedural rule because it does not cut to the 
accuracy of a death sentence.138 The rule declared in Miller is 
 
 132. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353. The Supreme Court applies this reasoning to 
both convictions and punishments. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329–
30 (1989) (“Therefore, the first exception set forth in Teague should be under-
stood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain prima-
ry conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a 
class of defendants because of their status or offense.”). 
 133. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.; see also Levick & Schwartz, supra 117, at 386 (arguing that Miller 
creates a substantive rule). 
 136. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. 
Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). 
 137. See Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328–30 (Minn. 2013). 
 138. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 357 (2004). 
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distinguishable because it almost certainly could affect the ac-
curacy of a particular sentence.139 Miller requires consideration 
of many differences between juveniles and adults that could af-
fect a judge’s determination of a juvenile offender’s culpabil-
ity.140 In addition, when comparing the requirement from Gide-
on v. Wainwright that criminal offenders receive counsel141 (the 
only accepted watershed procedural rule),142 with the require-
ment of considering youthfulness when sentencing juvenile 
homicide offenders, both rules carry significant importance, es-
pecially when compared with the rule considered in Schriro.143 
The rule at issue in Schriro simply shifts the fact-finding re-
sponsibility from judge to jury, whereas Gideon and Miller add 
a completely new element into the process—in one case an at-
torney and in the other, consideration of youthfulness.144  
3. Miller Is Retroactive 
Whether the Supreme Court eventually finds that Miller is 
a new substantive rule or a watershed procedural rule, it is 
likely that the Court will find a way to make Miller retroactive. 
The Court remanded Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on col-
lateral review, for re-consideration in light of Miller.145 This 
move strongly suggests that the Court feels juvenile lifers pre-
viously sentenced to mandatory life without parole should have 
new sentencing hearings where their youthfulness is taken into 
account.146 Additionally, the Court’s issuance of a GVR for a 
case on collateral review (although not a mandatory life with-
out parole case), requiring the lower court to consider the case 
 
 139. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller strongly supports this infer-
ence. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (stating that sentences of life without pa-
role for juvenile offenders will be rare once judges take youthfulness into ac-
count). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 142. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007). 
 143. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 357. 
 144. Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475, and Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344, with 
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 357. The Nebraska Supreme Court also agrees that the 
Miller rule is more significant than the rule considered in Schriro. See State v. 
Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 730 & n.94 (2014) (stating that “Miller did not 
simply change what entity considered the same facts,” in reference to Ring, 
the rule considered in Schriro). 
 145. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (reversing both Jackson’s and Miller’s cas-
es). 
 146. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 392. 
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in light of Miller, suggests that the Court believes the princi-
ples from Miller are retroactive on collateral review.147  
Alternatively, the Supreme Court may never rule on Mil-
ler’s retroactivity, and leave it to lower courts to determine ret-
roactivity for themselves. In that case, Miller will certainly be 
retroactive in at least some jurisdictions, and those courts will 
have to figure out how to apply Miller retroactively.148 Even if 
the Supreme Court rules that Miller is not retroactive, states 
currently applying Miller retroactively can and will continue to 
do so.149 One way or another, Miller will be retroactive in at 
least some jurisdictions.150 
B. RE-SENTENCING JUVENILE LIFERS: THE PARADOX OF 
TREATING ADULTS LIKE CHILDREN151 
Since Miller is retroactive in at least some jurisdictions, 
and, as previously argued, should be retroactive nationwide, 
courts must determine how to resentence juvenile lifers. This is 
a new problem courts face in juvenile criminal cases because 
although previous Supreme Court juvenile justice cases cate-
gorically banned certain sentences,152 Miller requires courts to 
broaden the scope of possible sentences.153 After previous juve-
nile justice rulings courts could simply commute the affected 
juvenile offenders’ sentences to the next lowest offense. For ex-
ample, after Roper courts could commute juvenile death sen-
tences to life without parole.154 Similarly, after Graham courts 
could commute non-homicide juvenile offender life without pa-
 
 147. See Mauricio v. California, 133 S. Ct. 524, 524 (2012); see also 
Satanovsky, supra note 121. 
 148. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115–17 (Iowa 2013); Jones 
v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–02 (Miss. 2013) (en banc). 
 149. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 551 U.S. 264, 291 (2008) (“A decision by 
this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not 
imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of 
trial–only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts.”).  
 150. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115–17; Jones, 102 So. 3d at 701–02. 
 151. “Treating adults like children” is an inversion of a phrase Marsha 
Levick uses when describing the many paradoxes of treating juvenile lifers 
like adults. Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 394. 
 152. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2011) (issuing a 
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide of-
fenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (issuing a categorical 
ban on death sentences for juveniles). 
 153. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).  
 154. See Tamar Birckhead, Should Miller v. Alabama Be Applied Retroac-
tively?, JUV. JUST. BLOG (Aug. 15, 2012), http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc 
.edu/2012/08/15/should-miller-v-alabama-be-applied-retroactively. 
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role sentences to life with the possibility of parole.155 Miller, on 
the other hand, does not preclude courts from sentencing juve-
niles to life without parole; it requires courts to consider 
“youthfulness” characteristics before sentencing juveniles to life 
without parole.156 This makes re-sentencing juvenile lifers much 
more complicated than simply commuting their sentences. 
Other than just requiring more work for lower courts,157 
considering “youthfulness” characteristics when re-sentencing 
juvenile lifers could be moot, because many of these individuals 
are no longer juveniles. In Miller, the Court lists several factors 
courts should consider when sentencing juveniles: family and 
home environment; extent of participation in the offense, and 
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected the ju-
venile; the offender’s possible inability to deal with police offic-
ers or prosecutors; and the possibility of rehabilitation.158 The 
Miller court especially stresses the final factor, possibility of 
rehabilitation, throughout its entire opinion.159 The fact that ju-
veniles’ unique characteristics are not permanent is a main jus-
tification for treating juveniles differently.160 The Court stresses 
that because juveniles can change, courts should not mandato-
rily subject juveniles to punishments that foreclose a chance to 
change.161 The Court’s main justification for concluding that af-
ter Miller life without parole sentences will be “rare,” is that a 
juvenile offender’s crime does not reflect “irreparable corrup-
tion,” but rather “transient immaturity.”162 The Court suggests 
that if sentencers could tell which juveniles are actually just 
“bad seeds,” harsh punishments such as life without parole 
would be justified for those juveniles.163 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 157. Cf. Feld, supra note 24, at 316, 319–20 (describing how Miller did not 
leave judges and parole boards with practical guidance of how to consider 
youthfulness in trials and arguing that a categorical rule of reduced punish-
ments for juveniles is more workable).  
 158. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 159. See id. at 2464, 2468–69. 
 160. See id. at 2464 (listing transitory personality as one of “three signifi-
cant gaps” that Graham, Roper, and ultimately Miller rely on to establish that 
juveniles are less deserving of overly severe punishments, such as death or life 
without parole); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–68, 73 (2010); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
 161. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69. 
 162. Id. at 2469. 
 163. See id.  
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Many juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to mandatory 
life without parole are no longer juveniles.164 For example, 
Kuntrell Jackson, sentenced at fourteen, is now twenty-nine.165 
Adult juvenile-lifers’ personalities are now for the most part 
fixed.166 Although some psychologists disagree that personali-
ties become fixed at any point in life,167 the general consensus 
throughout the twentieth century was that people’s personali-
ties become fixed somewhere around turning thirty.168 The 
Court also seems to accept the theory that people’s personali-
ties become fixed at some point, since transitory personality is 
one of its three main justifications for subjecting juvenile of-
fenders to less harsh punishments than adults.169 With this 
knowledge, it is unclear how a court could re-sentence a juve-
nile lifer using youthfulness characteristics that are primarily 
justified based on transitory personalities in juveniles when the 
juvenile lifer no longer has a transitory personality. The court 
will, theoretically, now know whether the juvenile lifer is 
plagued with “irreparable corruption.”170  
This paradox of re-sentencing adult juvenile lifers with 
youthfulness characteristics creates a problem. Juvenile lifers 
are still entitled to the justice Miller affords them, but complete 
re-sentencing hearings examining the offenders’ crime in a 
vacuum may lead to absurd results. For example, one could en-
vision a situation in which a juvenile lifer’s crime was extreme-
ly depraved and, despite youthfulness characteristics, worthy of 
life without parole, but his current, adult behavior demon-
 
 164. See, e.g., Maggie Clark, After Supreme Court Ruling, States Act on Ju-
venile Sentences, PEW (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research 
-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/26/after-supreme-court-ruling-states-act-
on-juvenile-sentences (discussing juvenile lifer Henry Hill, who is now forty); 
Jones, supra note 15 (discussing juvenile lifer Jeffrey Ragland, who is now for-
ty-five). 
 165. Inmate Details of Kuntrell Jackson, supra note 1. 
 166. See Antonio Terracciano et al., Personality Plasticity After Age 30, 32 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 999, 999, 1007 (2006) (finding that the 
study strengthens claims of predominant personality stability after age 30). 
 167. See, e.g., Sanjay Srivastava et al., Development of Personality in Early 
and Middle Adulthood: Set Like Plaster or Persistent Change?, 84 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1041, 1051 (2003) (“Mean levels of personality traits 
changed gradually but systematically throughout the life span, sometimes 
more after age 30 than before.”). 
 168. See generally id. at 1042 (providing an overview of the widely accepted 
“plaster theory,” which postulates that personality traits reach maturity by 
age thirty). 
 169. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
 170. Id. at 2469. 
BOONE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:10 PM 
2015] RE-SENTENCING JUVENILE LIFERS 1181 
 
strates maturity and reform. It would be absurd to re-sentence 
this offender to life without parole based on a transitory per-
sonality theory (in this case concluding that the offender in fact 
has a depraved personality) when we know he has grown into 
an upright, respectable individual.171 
1. New Sentencing Trial 
Lower courts are granting juvenile lifers retroactive appli-
cation of Miller, and many juvenile lifers will receive new sen-
tencing hearings as a result.172 No court has addressed the 
problem of implementing Miller’s holding to adult juvenile-
lifers.173  
In State v. Simmons, the Louisiana Supreme Court in-
structed the district court to reconsider a juvenile’s life without 
parole sentence “after conducting a sentencing hearing in ac-
cord with the principles enunciated in Miller.”174 Because a ju-
venile’s transitory personality is a bedrock principle in Miller,175 
it would follow that the Louisiana Supreme Court expects lower 
courts to address this characteristic in sentencing hearings. 
The court provided no guidance, however, about how this prin-
ciple applies to an offender who is now thirty-six years old.176  
In Jones v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court set forth 
similar instructions, requiring the lower court to conduct a new 
 
 171. Another example of an absurd result: A juvenile lifer was heavily in-
fluenced by his peers to participate in a robbery that ended up in the murder 
of a bystander. The juvenile lifer was subject to mandatory life without parole. 
The juvenile lifer, now an adult, is constantly involved in extremely violent 
acts in prison which suggest that he should not have the opportunity for re-
lease. Based on Miller, the juvenile lifer is likely eligible to receive a lower 
sentence for his crime, but his current actions do not support a lower sentence. 
 172. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Ark. 2013); State v. 
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013); State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28, 28 
(La. 2012) (per curiam); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–02 (Miss. 2013) 
(en banc); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014); People v. Wil-
liams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 
1010, 1022–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 173. See, e.g., Norris, 426 S.W.3d at 910; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122; 
Simmons, 99 So. 3d at 28; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 701–02; Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 
at 732; Williams, 982 N.E.2d at 199; Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022. 
 174. Simmons, 99 So. 3d at 28. 
 175. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (listing transitory 
personality as one of “three significant gaps” that Graham, Roper, and ulti-
mately Miller rely on to establish that juveniles are less deserving of overly 
severe punishments, such as death or life without parole). 
 176. Simmons, 99 So. 3d at 28 (stating that Simmons was seventeen when 
he committed his crime in 1995). 
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sentencing hearing in which it considers “all circumstances set 
forth in Miller.”177 Like Louisiana, it would follow that the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court expects transitory personality to be 
considered in this sentencing hearing, but there is no explana-
tion about how to apply this characteristic to a twenty-five-
year-old.178 In this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court actually 
declined a request from the juvenile lifer’s attorneys that the 
court clarify what it “intends to happen when [the offender’s] 
case goes back to [the lower court] for re-sentencing.”179  
In State v. Mantich, the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered 
re-sentencing comporting with a revised Nebraska sentencing 
statute.180 Although the Nebraska court provided more struc-
tured instructions by virtue of pointing to a statute,181 the court 
did not explain how this statute should apply to current juve-
nile lifers versus new juvenile offenders.182 Since the court made 
no distinction between offenders being re-sentenced, and of-
fenders being sentenced for the first time, it is fair to assume 
that Nebraska expects re-sentencing hearings to consider all 
Miller youthfulness factors, including transitory personality, 
the same way it would for new offenders.183 It is unclear how 
this analysis would work when re-sentencing a thirty-six-year-
old who has spent twenty years in prison.184 
 
 177. Jones, 122 So. 3d at 701 n.4. The Arkansas Supreme Court has also 
issued an opinion setting forth instructions similar to those in Simmons and 
Jones. See Norris, 426 S.W.3d at 907 (requiring a sentencing hearing in which 
the defendant “may present . . . evidence that would include that of his ‘age, 
age-related characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime”). 
 178. See Jones, 122 So. 3d. at 701 n.4, 702; Patsy R. Brumfield, Court De-
nies Rehearing for Brett Jones, NE. MISS. DAILY J. (Sep. 27, 2013), 
http://djournal.com/news/update-court-denies-brett-jones-hearing 
-sentenc-questions (stating that Jones was twenty-four in September, 2013). 
 179. The Sun Herald, Court Denies Rehearing for Brett Jones, MISS. ST. 
NEWS (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.mississippi.statenews.net/index.php/ 
sid/217384530/scat/a97a4109a449ff84; see also Brumfield, supra note 178. 
 180. State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731–32 (Neb. 2014). 
 181. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2) (2013) (providing examples of fac-
tors courts can look at in sentencing). 
 182. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 732. 
 183. Even though the statute governing Mantich’s re-sentencing hearing 
does not list transitory personality as a factor, the statute is not limited to the 
factors listed. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2). Since, as explained, transitory 
personality is a bedrock principle in Miller v. Alabama, Nebraska would ex-
pect this factor to be considered when retroactively applying Miller. See supra 
note 175 and accompanying text. 
 184. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 718–19 (stating that Mantich was sixteen in 
1994 when the murder took place). 
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The Iowa Supreme Court is the only court that has articu-
lated a clear set of expectations for re-sentencing hearings 
based on Miller. In State v. Ragland, the court affirmed a dis-
trict court’s re-sentencing hearing of a juvenile lifer, stating 
that the court “properly resentenced Ragland in light of Mil-
ler.”185 The district court re-sentencing hearing included testi-
mony from Ragland’s friends and family.186 A business owner 
testified that he would give Ragland a job upon release, and 
Ragland’s brother testified that he would give Ragland a place 
to live and had developed a relationship with the victim’s 
brother.187 Additionally, one of Ragland’s accomplices testified, 
claiming that Ragland was minimally involved in the murder.188 
After hearing this evidence, the district court re-sentenced 
Ragland to life with the possibility of parole after serving twen-
ty-five years—which incidentally made Ragland immediately 
eligible for parole.189 
This district court reasoning, which the Iowa Supreme 
Court accepted, provides the most guidance thus far on how to 
adequately re-sentence juvenile lifers. Although the district 
court’s method is workable, it does not follow Miller exactly, be-
cause the court did not consider all Miller evidence.190 For ex-
ample, the court excluded discussion of Ragland’s transitory 
personality, and only minimally included other youthfulness 
characteristics such as impulsivity, immaturity, and environ-
mental factors.191 The court focused more on Ragland’s charac-
ter at the moment of re-sentencing, and less on his youthful-
ness characteristics at the time the crime was committed.192 
There was little discussion of whether Ragland, at the time he 
committed the crime and because of the nature of the crime, 
 
 185. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013). 
 186. Id. at 112. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 112–13. 
 190. Compare Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (listing rele-
vant factors in sentencing a juvenile: family and home environment; extent of 
participation in the offense and the way peer pressure may have affected him; 
the offender’s possible inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors; and 
the possibility of rehabilitation), with Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112–13 (looking 
at family and home environment, maturity, and relationship with the victim 
in the present, not at the time of the crime). 
 191. Ragland’s accomplice briefly discusses the group of boys’ poor home 
lives and immaturity. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112. 
 192. Id. at 112–13. 
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deserved life without parole.193 The court stated that the gover-
nor’s previous commutation of Ragland’s sentence to life with 
the possibility of parole after serving sixty years was not ade-
quate under Miller because it “deprived Ragland of a meaning-
ful opportunity to demonstrate his maturity and rehabilita-
tion.”194 This declaration further establishes that the court was 
focused on Ragland’s current personality, rather than youth-
fulness characteristics at the time of the crime. Even though 
the district court’s re-sentencing hearing was practical and 
brought justice for Ragland, it did not properly implement Mil-
ler and looks more like a parole hearing than a sentencing 
hearing.195 
2. Automatic Lesser Sentence 
The paradox of treating adults like children when imple-
menting Miller during re-sentencing hearings is avoidable if 
states completely preclude life without parole for juveniles. In 
that situation, if Miller is retroactive courts could automatical-
ly commute juvenile lifers’ sentences to the next lowest sen-
tence.196 Several states are taking this route.197 
Wyoming, a state that imposed mandatory life without pa-
role for some juvenile homicide offenders before Miller, has 
changed its sentencing laws to preclude discretionary life with-
out parole sentences for juvenile offenders.198 Wyoming now 
sentences juveniles convicted of first-degree murder to life im-
 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Parole hearings typically consider factors almost identical to those 
considered in Ragland’s hearing. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19 (2013) (stating that 
parole hearings should consider offender’s chances of recidivism upon release, 
and should encourage persons interested in prisoner to testify); Lifer Parole 
Process, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/ 
lifer_parole_process.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (listing factors to consider 
in parole, including “plans for the future”). 
 196. See Birckhead, supra note 154; Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 
389 (“If state law already provides for an alternative term of years or life sen-
tence with the possibility of parole, the sentencer can likely impose one of 
those options . . . .”). 
 197. See, e.g., H.R. 0023, 62nd Leg., 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); 
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283–85 (Mass. 2013); 
Associated Press, Juveniles Convicted of Murder Must Get Parole Chance in 
Mich., THE BLADE (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2013/ 
08/13/Juveniles-convicted-of-murder-must-get-parole-chance-in-Mich.html; 
Hawaii Becomes Latest State To Abolish Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentenc-
es, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (July 7, 2014), http://www.eji.org/node/924. 
 198. Wyo. H.R. 0023. 
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prisonment with the possibility of parole after serving twenty-
five years.199 If Wyoming applies Miller retroactively, or the Su-
preme Court eventually rules that Miller is retroactive, Wyo-
ming could simply commute all current juvenile lifers’ sentenc-
es to life with the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five 
years.200 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that any life with-
out parole sentences for juveniles—discretionary or mandato-
ry—violate state constitutional law.201 The Massachusetts rul-
ing is retroactive,202 so all juvenile lifers will automatically have 
their sentences commuted to the next lowest sentence.203 Cur-
rently, life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years is 
the next lowest sentence,204 but the Massachusetts legislature is 
considering legislation requiring juvenile murderers to serve at 
least thirty-five years.205  
In Michigan, a U.S. District Court judge issued an order 
requiring Michigan to grant parole consideration to any juve-
niles convicted of murder.206 The judge’s ruling essentially pre-
cludes life without parole sentences for any juvenile offenders 
in Michigan.207 Even though the Michigan Supreme Court has 
held that Miller does not apply retroactively,208 if the United 
States Supreme Court holds that Miller is retroactive, Michi-
 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 389. 
 201. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 283–85. 
 202. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 262–63 (Mass. 2013). 
 203. Id. In Diatchenko, the juvenile lifer was automatically granted parole 
consideration since he had been serving for thirty-one years. 1 N.E.3d at 286. 
 204. Sarah Schweitzer & Michael Levenson, Mass. SJC Bars No-Parole 
Life Terms for Youths, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe 
.com/metro/2013/12/24/mass-high-court-strikes-down-life-without-parole 
-sentences-for-juveniles/eyjKrVSE2EXD0KF7wQXX5M/story.html. 
 205. Milton J. Valencia, Bill Seeks at Least 35 Years for Young Killers, BOS. 
GLOBE (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/01/24/ 
legislators-propose-parole-hearings-for-juvenile-murderers-only-after-they 
-have-served-years-prison/Dis1vi9GEqBgt9BovNmQ4I/story.html. 
 206. See Associated Press, supra note 197; Kate Abbey-Lambertz & Ashley 
Woods, Michigan Juvenile Life Without Parole Mandatory Sentencing Ban 
Upheld by Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/michigan-juvenile-life-without-parole 
-sentencing_n_3756853.html; Jonathan Oosting, Federal Judge Says All Mich-
igan ‘Juvenile Lifers’ Eligible for Parole; Bill Schuette Disagrees, MLIVE (Aug. 
13, 2013), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/08/federal_judge_ 
every_juvenile_l.html. 
 207. If all juvenile lifers receive parole consideration, then they technically 
are not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 
 208. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 827–28 (Mich. 2014). 
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gan could commute all juvenile lifers’ sentences to allow parole 
consideration.209 
Although Wyoming, Massachusetts, and Michigan have 
easy solutions for retroactively applying Miller because they all 
preclude life without parole for juveniles, this is not the case for 
most states that imposed mandatory life without parole on ju-
venile homicide offenders pre-Miller.210 Many states changed 
their laws to comply with Miller but still allow discretionary 
life without parole sentences for some juvenile homicide offend-
ers after considering Miller’s youthfulness characteristics.211 In 
these cases, juvenile lifers need complete re-sentencing hear-
ings to determine if life without parole is still justified in light 
of the Miller factors, and courts must solve the paradox of 
treating adults like children.212 
C. THE PROBLEM OF PAROLE 
Whether through a new sentencing hearing or an automat-
ic lesser sentence, at least some adult juvenile-lifers will soon 
face parole boards.213 Some scholars suggest that juvenile lifers 
 
 209. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 389. It should be noted that 
Michigan is considering legislation that would retain a life without parole sen-
tence, and the district court case requiring parole consideration for all juvenile 
lifers is on appeal. Associated Press, Mich. House OKs Sentencing Rules for 
Young Killers, CBS DETROIT (Feb. 5, 2014), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2014/ 
02/05/mich-house-oks-sentencing-rules-for-young-killers. If the legislation 
passes and/or the case is reversed, Michigan would face the same re-
sentencing problems as other states. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 210. See Maggie Clark, After Supreme Court Ruling, States Act on Juvenile 
Sentences, PEW (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and 
-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/26/after-supreme-court-ruling-states-act-on-
juvenile-sentences (“[T]here are at least 15 states that have not yet eliminated 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.”); How Many People Are 
Serving in My State?, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, 
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reports-and-research/how-many-people-are 
-serving-in-my-state (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (breaking down which states 
still allow life without parole); James Swift, Miller v. Alabama: One Year Lat-
er, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (June 25, 2013), http://jjie.org/miller-v 
-alabama-one-year-later (stating that at least seven states have kept life with-
out parole as a possible sentence for juvenile homicide offenders).  
 211. See, e.g., S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Ass. (Del. 2013) (removing mandatory life 
without parole, but retaining life without parole as a maximum sentence for 
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder); S.B. 228, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Utah 
2013) (making aggravated murder committed by a juvenile a noncapital first 
degree felony punishable under section 76-3-207.7 of the Utah Criminal Code); 
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (2012) (naming life without parole as a 
possible punishment for juveniles convicted of noncapital first degree felonies). 
 212. See supra Part II.B.1.  
 213. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 112–13, 122 (Iowa 2013). 
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facing parole boards could be problematic, because juvenile of-
fenders serving long sentences are more likely to have adverse 
prison experiences.214  
Juvenile offenders serving long sentences are often imme-
diately sent to prison with adult offenders.215 These juvenile 
prisoners face the same prison challenges that adult offenders 
face, but because they are juveniles, they lack the mental or 
physical ability to adjust to prison life.216 Since juveniles are 
less emotionally well adjusted, juvenile lifers often “use vio-
lence to express anger or to protect themselves.”217 Additionally, 
juvenile lifers typically receive fewer rehabilitative services 
than prisoners with shorter sentences, and once they turn 
eighteen “[they] face[] an uphill battle to obtain additional edu-
cational opportunities in prison.”218 Prison violence and a lack of 
marketable skills are important factors during parole hearings, 
and juvenile lifers who have not made efforts towards rehabili-
tation may be passed over for parole.219 
Juvenile lifers also have trouble remaining hopeful, and of-
ten lose touch with friends and family throughout their prison 
sentences.220 Most prisoners serving long sentences, adults and 
juveniles alike, “lose social support and family connections.”221 
For juvenile prisoners, who likely rely on their friends and fam-
 
 214. See Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do To Provide a 
Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and 
Potential, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 310, 337 (2012); Levick & Schwartz, supra 
note 117, at 394. 
 215. See, e.g., Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 338 (discussing juveniles 
serving time in a Florida prison). 
 216. Id. at 337. 
 217. Id. 
 218. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 68 
(2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
therestoftheirlives.pdf; see also id. at 5 (“[Juvenile lifers] are denied educa-
tional, vocational, and other programs to develop their minds and skills be-
cause access to those programs is typically restricted to prisoners who will 
someday be released, and for whom rehabilitation therefore remains a goal.”); 
Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 340 (“Confronted with limited resources, 
prisons often give enrollment preference for education, vocational, and other 
services to inmates with shorter sentences.”); Levick & Schwartz, supra note 
117, at 398 (explaining how juvenile lifers are systematically excluded from 
educational and vocational programs). 
 219. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19 (2013); Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 
394, 409; Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195. 
 220. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 61; 
Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 338. 
 221. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 61. 
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ily more than adult prisoners, these relationship losses could be 
especially detrimental.222 Additionally, not only will losing rela-
tionships with loved ones hurt juvenile lifers emotionally, it 
could hurt their chances for parole. In parole hearings judges 
look at a prisoner’s likelihood for rehabilitation,223 and having 
someone to provide living arrangements or a job is useful when 
convincing a judge that a prisoner will have no problem re-
entering society.224 As juvenile lifers begin to face parole boards 
(based on either a re-sentencing hearing or an automatic lesser 
sentence) it is unclear if these offenders will even qualify for 
parole because of the detrimental effects of prison.225 It is possi-
ble that adult juvenile lifers granted lower sentences post-
Miller will not realize tangible justice in the form of freedom.226 
Miller is retroactive, at least in some states, and many ju-
venile lifers will have their mandatory life without parole sen-
tences re-considered.227 States keeping discretionary life with-
out parole sentences for juveniles must re-sentence juvenile 
lifers, taking into account Miller’s youthfulness factors—
including transitory personality—before making sentencing de-
cisions.228 Taking transitory personality into account creates a 
paradox of treating adults like children, because juvenile lifers’ 
have grown up and no longer have transitory personalities.229 
So far, courts conducting re-sentencing hearings have not 
solved this paradox, and focus more on the juvenile lifer’s reha-
bilitation efforts rather than the actual crime.230 Some states 
are avoiding the paradox of treating adults like children alto-
gether, by precluding any life without parole sentences for ju-
 
 222. Id. (“The difference for youth offenders serving life without parole is 
that they are likely to be much more dependent on family relationships than 
older inmates and may suffer these losses at an earlier age, causing them to 
endure their loss longer than other inmates.”). 
 223. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19; Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 394; 
Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195. 
 224. For example, in juvenile lifer Ragland’s re-sentencing hearing de-
scribed in State v. Ragland, testimony about Ragland’s ability to get a job from 
a friend and live with his brother upon release were key. 836 N.W.2d 107, 
112–13 (Iowa 2013).  
 225. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 394–95. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See, e.g., People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); 
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122; Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 
N.E.3d 270, 281–82 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702–03 (Miss. 
2013) (en banc). 
 228. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). 
 229. See supra notes 152–171 and accompanying text. 
 230. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112–13. 
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veniles and automatically commuting juvenile lifers’ sentenc-
es,231 but most states are electing to keep discretionary life 
without parole sentences for juveniles and must solve the para-
dox.232 Finally, even if courts manage to re-sentence juvenile lif-
ers, or states commute juvenile lifers’ sentences, many offend-
ers may never receive parole because of the inherent difficulties 
involved in serving prison sentences as a juvenile lifer.233 
III.  SENTENCING/PAROLE HYBRID HEARINGS: A 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH   
Because new sentencing hearings face the paradox of treat-
ing adults like children and may lead to absurd results,234 and 
because not all states preclude life without parole for juve-
niles,235 many adult juvenile lifers will face difficulties when 
pursuing post-Miller justice. Section A of this Part argues that 
complete re-sentencing hearings are untenable because com-
pletely adhering to Miller’s requirements is unpractical for 
many juvenile lifers seeking new sentences, and courts should 
instead conduct “hybrid hearings.” Hybrid hearings will exam-
ine the relevant youthfulness characteristics from Miller, but 
will avoid the paradox of treating adults like children by also 
focusing on the juvenile lifers’ current characteristics and their 
chances for rehabilitation. Section B of this Part addresses 
some problems with hybrid hearings, but argues that these 
hearings are still the most practical way for adult juvenile lif-
ers to attain Miller justice. 
A. AVOIDING THE PARADOX: “HYBRID HEARINGS” 
In theory, new sentencing hearings for juvenile lifers 
should focus on the sentence warranted for the crime, not on 
the events that transpired between imposition of mandatory 
life without parole and the present.236 If courts completely ad-
here to Miller’s requirements when conducting new sentencing 
 
 231. See H.R. 0023, 62nd Leg., 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); Diatchenko, 1 
N.E.3d at 283–85; Associated Press, supra note 197. 
 232. See sources cited supra note 211. 
 233. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 393–94. 
 234. See supra notes 152–70 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 236. Courts applying retroactivity have remanded for new sentencing trials 
in accord with Miller, and have not given any instructions to address the of-
fender’s current likelihood for rehabilitation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 426 
S.W.3d 906, 911 (Ark. 2013) (instructing the court “to hold a sentencing hear-
ing where Jackson may present Miller evidence”). 
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hearings for adult juvenile lifers, they must look at the offender 
at the time of the crime, and address youthfulness characteris-
tics.237 Courts must ask the question: Does the offender’s behav-
ior and life circumstances suggest that this crime was a simple 
youthful indiscretion, or is it evidence of a depraved personali-
ty?238 As explained above, this question’s answer could some-
times lead to absurd results.239 Even in situations that do not 
lead to absurd results,240 addressing transitory personality may 
be moot, and courts (federal courts at least) should not waste 
judicial resources addressing moot issues.241 
This Note proposes a solution that avoids mootness and 
absurd results: “hybrid hearings.” Hybrid hearings combine 
sentencing and parole hearings. These hearings will allow 
courts to focus on a juvenile lifer’s youthfulness characteristics 
at the time of the crime, but also the offender’s current person-
ality. The district court hearing approved in State v. Ragland, 
discussed above, offers a good example for how these hearings 
could be conducted.242 A juvenile lifer could present evidence 
that his or her youthfulness constitutes diminished culpability 
for the crime committed.243 Some examples include demonstrat-
ing peer pressure by a group of friends,244 simply being in the 
 
 237. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“[W]e require it to 
take into account how children are different, and how those differences coun-
sel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”). 
 238. See id.  
 239. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 240. It is possible that a juvenile lifer’s personality has not drastically 
changed and that a court would end up with a result that makes sense. For 
example, a juvenile who was minimally involved in his or her crime and was 
heavily influenced by peers might now demonstrate maturity and a strong 
possibility for rehabilitation. 
 241. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316–20 (1974) (per curiam) 
(explaining that federal courts cannot decide moot issues). Even if state courts 
are not precluded from considering moot issues, one could imagine that it 
would be uncomfortable for a court and/or offender to discuss issues that are 
no longer relevant. 
 242. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 112–13 (Iowa 2013). 
 243. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (stating that juve-
niles have “diminished culpability”). 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 2468 (“To be sure, Jackson learned on the way to the 
video store that his friend Shields was carrying a gun, but his age could well 
have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness 
to walk away at that point.”); Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 
2004) (stating that Jackson only found out that his friend had a gun on the 
way to the robbery). 
BOONE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:10 PM 
2015] RE-SENTENCING JUVENILE LIFERS 1191 
 
wrong place at the wrong time,245 living in a violent environ-
ment,246 proving that the offender was not the primary actor in 
the crime,247 or showing that the offender acted on impulse.248  
In addition to presenting youthfulness evidence to prove 
diminished culpability for the crime, the juvenile lifer could al-
so demonstrate rehabilitation. This would allow the important 
transitory personality characteristic from Miller to come in ex 
post. By demonstrating rehabilitation, the offender can prove 
his or her actions were evidence of a transitory personality, ra-
ther than a permanently depraved personality. Evidence that 
could prove transitory personality/rehabilitation would be simi-
lar to evidence typically presented in parole hearings.249 Some 
examples are: guaranteed job upon release,250 having a place to 
live upon release,251 marketable skills acquired in prison,252 
demonstrating remorse for the crime,253 or clean prison rec-
ords.254  
Examining youthfulness characteristics at the time of the 
crime alongside current personality characteristics avoids ab-
 
 245. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (emphasizing that Jackson did not 
even shoot the victim); Ragland, 326 N.W.2d at 112 (quoting Ragland’s ac-
complice’s statement that Ragland “was unlucky to be with [him] that night, 
not the other way around”). 
 246. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (commenting that both Jackson’s 
mother and his grandmother had previously shot people); id. at 2462, 2469 
(explaining that Miller attempted suicide as a child, his stepfather physically 
abused him, and his mother neglected him); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112 
(quoting Ragland’s accomplice’s statement that the “time and place” in which 
the boys grew up influenced their actions). 
 247. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (emphasizing that Jackson did not 
even shoot the victim). 
 248. See, e.g., id. at 2462, 2469 (stating that Miller committed his crime 
while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and that Miller grabbed a 
baseball bat after the victim grabbed him by the throat). 
 249. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19 (2013); Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195. 
 250. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112 (stating that a businessman 
“testified he would gladly hire Ragland upon release from prison”). 
 251. See, e.g., id. (stating that Ragland’s brother testified that “living ar-
rangements” would be “in place” upon Ragland’s release). 
 252. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 403 (“Many state codes ex-
plicitly require parole boards to use rehabilitation as the central benchmark 
for parole decisions.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W. 2d at 112 (quoting Ragland’s brother’s 
statement that Ragland had built a relationship with the victim’s brother); 
Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195 (listing “signs of remorse” as a factor tend-
ing to indicate an inmate’s suitability for parole in California). 
 254. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18 (“[T]he Commission must determine that the 
prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or institutions 
in which he has been confined . . . .”). 
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surd results and potential mootness problems. The court would 
no longer look at the crime in a vacuum, examining character-
istics that may no longer be relevant to the offender.255 If the 
juvenile’s crime was so extreme that a court might find it evi-
dence of a depraved personality, but the offender currently 
demonstrates maturity, a court would not come to the absurd 
result of keeping the life without parole sentence when it is no 
longer warranted.256 Hybrid hearings are a practical solution 
that can bring juvenile lifers the justice they deserve post-
Miller. 
B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH HYBRID HEARINGS 
Even though hybrid hearings solve the paradox of treating 
adults like children, there are several problems with these 
hearings that should be addressed. One problem with hybrid 
hearings is that, as explained above, juveniles serving life 
without parole sentences are often disadvantaged in prison.257 
These offenders may not receive the benefit of educational and 
vocational programs, which incidentally may make it less likely 
that the offender will have a job upon release.258 Additionally, 
these offenders entered prison at a tumultuous time in their 
lives without any hope of release, and may have acted violently 
as a result.259 Some offenders may have violent prison records, 
not because they have depraved personalities, but because they 
had no incentive to act otherwise.260 Also, many juvenile lifers 
may not have friends and family willing to provide living ar-
rangements upon release, because juvenile offenders serving 
life sentences are less likely to maintain relationships.261 All of 
these unfortunate consequences of serving long prison sentenc-
es could severely disadvantage juvenile lifers in hybrid hear-
ings. Courts conducting hybrid hearings should keep these 
facts in mind, and understand that even if a prisoner has diffi-
 
 255. See supra notes 152–171 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra Part II.C. 
 258. Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 340 (“Confronted with limited re-
sources, prisons often give enrollment preference for education, vocational, 
and other services to inmates with shorter sentences.”); Levick & Schwartz, 
supra note 117, at 398 (explaining how juvenile lifers are systematically ex-
cluded from educational and vocational programs). 
 259. Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 337. 
 260. Id. 
 261. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 61. 
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culty proving rehabilitation it may not mean that there is no 
hope for the offender.  
Another problem with hybrid hearings is that they likely 
will favor juvenile lifers with more resources. Juvenile lifers 
coming from well-off families or backgrounds likely will have 
more job and living options upon release.262 These offenders 
may have had resources entering prison that allowed them to 
enter educational programs other juvenile lifers were not of-
fered.263 Favoring juvenile lifers with more resources is prob-
lematic because it could perpetuate the cycle of violence in low-
income populations.264 Courts should weigh these factors when 
conducting hybrid hearings, and should keep class status in 
mind when making decisions. 
A third problem with hybrid hearings is that they are not a 
concrete solution, and are subject to the court’s discretion. 
Judges’ solutions could vary vastly from case to case, and some 
juvenile lifers may end up with better results than others. Un-
fortunately, this is a problem with any functional solution, and 
it is not easily resolved.265 Still, hybrid hearings allow flexibility 
to address each juvenile lifer’s individual circumstances.266 Also, 
since many states keep life without parole as a possible sen-
tence for juvenile lifers,267 a functional solution ensures that 
these offenders actually receive Miller justice. 
 
 262. Cf. Paul Street, Race, Prison, and Poverty, HIST. IS A WEAPON, 
http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/streeracpripov.html (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014) (“For those [parolees] with earnings, average annual wages were 
exceedingly low and differed significantly by race: white former inmates aver-
aged $7,880 per year and Blacks made just $4,762.”). 
 263. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 69 
(“Post-secondary education is only available to youth offenders serving life 
without parole if someone can pay the course fees, which tend to be beyond the 
means of most offenders’ families.”). 
 264. See generally Victor Eugene Flango & Edgar L. Sherbenou, Poverty, 
Urbanization, and Crime, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 331, 340 (1977) (finding that ur-
banization and poverty correlate with crime). 
 265. Professor Barry Feld’s “youth discount” could be one alternative. See 
Feld, supra note 24, at 316. The “youth discount” would categorically mitigate 
juvenile sentences rather than require individualized sentencing. Id. While 
this is a practical solution, it would not work for states that still want to sen-
tence some juveniles to life without parole. See, e.g., S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Ass. 
(Del. 2013). 
 266. Miller requires individualized sentencing hearings before sentencing 
juveniles to harsh penalties. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 
(2012). 
 267. See, e.g., Del. S.B. 9 (removing mandatory life without parole, but re-
taining life without parole as a maximum sentence for juveniles convicted of 
first-degree murder). 
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  CONCLUSION   
Miller v. Alabama provides juvenile lifers an opportunity 
for justice, and a chance to receive new sentences that take ju-
veniles’ diminished culpability into account. Unfortunately, 
adult juvenile lifers may face difficulties when seeking the ben-
efit of Miller. New sentencing hearings for juvenile lifers that 
have grown up must address the paradox of treating adults like 
children, and cannot implement the transitory personality 
characteristic—an important principle in Miller—without risk-
ing addressing a moot issue or ending up with an absurd result. 
Courts applying Miller retroactively have not addressed this 
problem, or have conducted sentencing hearings that do not 
consider transitory personality and other youthfulness charac-
teristics. Additionally, many states still keep life without parole 
as a possible sentence for some juvenile offenders, so most 
adult juvenile lifers’ cannot simply have their sentences com-
muted. 
Complete sentencing hearings are not the correct route for 
courts when re-sentencing adult juvenile lifers. Courts should 
use “hybrid hearings” that mix elements of sentencing and pa-
role hearings. Hybrid hearings will allow courts to address 
youthfulness characteristics as related to the crime committed, 
as well as the offender’s current personality and likelihood for 
rehabilitation. Addressing the adult juvenile lifer’s current per-
sonality allows courts to consider transitory personality ex post. 
Offenders can present evidence demonstrating that the crime 
committed only indicated a transitory personality, not a per-
manently depraved character. Hybrid hearings would solve the 
paradox of treating adults like children while staying true to 
the central principles in Miller. Most importantly, hybrid hear-
ings will allow juvenile lifers to receive tangible post-Miller jus-
tice. 
 
